Perm – Vote affirmative and embrace the negative’s counterdiscourse to the politics of fear.

Embrace instability of argumentation – a turn to openness is the most meaningful decision – star this card.

Corder, ‘85 [Jim W. Corder is Professor of English at Texas Christian University. In 1975 he received the NCTE's Braddock Prize. He has published articles on rhetoric in various journals and has written several textbooks on writing.; “Argument as Emergence, Rhetoric as Love”; Rhetoric Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Sep., 1985); Taylor & Francis]

d. We arguers can learn the lessons that rhetoric itself wants to teach us. By its nature, invention asks us to open ourselves to the richness of creation, to plumb its depths, search its expanses, and track its chronologies. But the moment we speak (or write), we are no longer open; we have chosen, whether deliberately or not, and so have closed ourselves off from some possibilities. Invention wants openness; structure and style demand closure. We are asked to be perpetually open and always closing. If we stay open, we cannot speak or act; if we are [sic] closed, we have succumbed to dogma and rigidity. Each utterance may deplete the inventive possibilities if a speaker falls into arro- gance, ignorance, or dogma. But each utterance, if the speaker having spoken opens again, may also nurture and replenish the speaker's inventive world and enable him or her to reach out around the other. Beyond any speaker's bound inventive world lies another: there lie the riches of creation, the great, un- bounded possible universe of invention. All time is there, past, present, and future. The natural and the supernatural are there. All creation is there, ground and source for invention. The knowledge we have is formed out of the plenti- tude of creation, which is all before us, but must be sought again and again through the cycling process of rhetoric, closing to speak, opening again to invent again. In an unlimited universe of meaning, we can never foreclose on interpretation and argument. Invention is a name for a great miracle-the attempt to unbind time, to loosen the capacities of time and space into our speaking. This copiousness is eternally there, a plentitude for all. Piaget remarked that the more an infant senses [sic], the more he or she wants to sense the world [sic]. Just this is what the cycling of rhetoric offers us: opening to invention, closing to speak, opening again to a richer invention. Utterances may thus be elevated, may grow to hold both arguer and other.

### Messianism Turn

#### PERMUTATION IS THE BEST OPTION – WAR IN THE NAME OF RELIGION MUST BE DECONSTRUCTED –– PRESUMING A SPECIFIC AND DEFINITE UNDERSTANDING OF MESSIANIC TRUTH MOBILIZES VIOLENCE AND IS THE MOTIVATION FOR EVERY RELIGIOUS WAR RATHER WE SHOULD REJECT THE MESSIANISM OF THE STATUS QUO FOR AN ABSOLUTE INDETERMINATE MESSIANIC TO COME

CAPUTO, THOMAS J. WATSON PROFESSOR OF RELIGION & HUMANITIES, 97

Deconstruction in a Nutshell

It is clear to anyone with a Jewish ear, to anyone with half an ear for Hebrew and Christian scriptures, that this whole thing called “deconstruction” turns out to have a very messianic ring. The messianic tone that deconstruction has recently adopted (which is no tall that recent and not only a tone) is the turn it takes toward the future. Not the relative and foreseeable programmable and plannable future—the future of strategic planning—but the absolute future, the welcome extended to an other whom I cannot, in principle, anticipate, the *tout autre* whose alternity disturbs the complacent circles of the same. The messianic future of which deconstruction dreams, its desire and its passion, is the unforeseeable future to come, absolutely to come, the justice, the democracy, the gift, the hospitality to come. Like Elijah knocking on our door! The first and last, the constant word in deconstruction is come, *viens*. If Derrida were a man of prayer—which he is, as I have elsewhere tried to show—“Come would be his prayer.

*Viens, oui, oui*. That is deconstruction in a word, in three words. In a nutshell.

Derrida at first avoided the notion of the messianic on the ground that it entailed the idea of a “horizon of possibility” for the future and, hence, of some sort of anticipatory encircling of what is to come. But after this initial “hesitation,” Derrida adopted the term “messianic,” evidently under the influence of Walter Benjamin. Benjamin spoke of a “weak messianic power” (the “weak” corresponding to what Derrida calls the messianic “without” messianism), which Benjamin associates with historical materialism. In Benjamin’s view, the present generation is to be viewed messanically, as those who were all along to come, those who were all along expected precisely in order to “redeem” the past. We today live in a pact with the disasters of the past, inheriting a promise we never made, to recall the dangerous memory of past suffering, which is a pledge not to be taken lightly. The “now,” the present time, is precisely a messianic time in which we are responsible for the entire history of humankind. Every present, every “second time,” what Derrida will call the “moment,” is “a strait gate through which the Messia might enter.” Every day is a “holy day,” a day of “remembrance,” an “all saints” day in which we remember the saints, the dead and their suffering. This Benjaminian motif enters crucially into what Derrida calls “the working of mourning” in the subtitle of the Marx book, the work of remembering the spirit of those who precede us (*revenants*) without assimilating their alterity into the present, where it collaborates with the distinctively Derridian motif of the justice “to come” and the affirmation of the future, of those who are yet to come.

Deconstruction encourages religion from its own worst instincts by holding the feet of religion to the fire of *faith,* insisting on seeing things through a glass darkly, that is on believing them not thinking that they are seeing them. Deconstruction saves religion from seeing things, from fanaticism and triumphalism. Deconstruction is not the destruction of religion but its reinvention.

Like an old and wise father confessor, deconstruction helps religion examine its conscience, counseling and chastening religion about its tendency to confuse its faith with knowledge, which results in the dangerous and absolutizing triumphalism of religion, which is what spills blood. Religion is most dangerous when it conceives itself as higher *knowledge* granted a chosen *few*, a chosen people of God: that is a formula for war. As if God favors Jews over Arabs, or prefers Christians to Jews, or Protestants to Catholics, thereby drawing God into the game of whose theological ox deserves goring. As if God took the side of one people against another or granted special privileges to one people that are denied to others—to “the other.” Religion so instructed deconstructed and reconstructed, closely hewn to its messianic and prophetic source and to the God who said that He does not delight in ritual sacrifice but in justice, religion as a powerful prophetic force which has a dream of justice for *all* God’s children—that is the religion that emerges from an hour on the couch with deconstruction. That religion is good news, for the oppressed and everybody else.

That is why Derrida distinguishes the Messianic as a universal structure (like Benjamin’s “weak” messianic) from the various “messianisms,” which are a little too strong. By the concrete messianisms he means the specific religious beliefs, the historical doctrines and dogmas, of the “religions of the Book,” all *thereof* them, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, although Derrida also extends the term to include the “philosophical messianisms,” the teleolgies and eschatologies of Hegel, Marx, Heidegger. To that list should be added the last minute of the latest, Johnny-come-lately version, Francis Fukuyama’s “gospel” of the good news that the free market is the *telos* toward which the West has been groaning and Ronald Reagan is its prophet. The distinguishing feature of any messianism is that it *determines* the figure of the Messiah, gives the Messiah a determinate characterization and specific configuration, with the result that the Messiahis *identifiably* Jewish, Christian, Islamic, or God forbid, Capitalistic, where a supply-side, free market Messiah is the latest teleological consummation of History. That contracts the absoluteness of the messianic promise and expectation within the borders of a *people*, so that God is thought to have cut a special deal with Greco-European Christians, or Jews, or Arabs; of a *language*, so that God is said to have spoken Hebrew, Greek—or was it Aramaic?—or Arabic’ of a *national history*, so that God is made to take his stand with the destiny of some nation-state and takes up arms within the strife among the nations. The messianisms have all the makings of a catastrophe, that is, of war. This they unfailingly provoke, with merciless regularity, under one of the most grotesque and terrifying names we know, that of a “holy war,” which means, alas, killing the children of God in the name of God, who too often really are children, killing the innocent in the name of peace and justice, killing in the name of the promise. Today, Derrida says, the war waged by these messianisms over the “appropriation of Jerusalem” has become a world war.

The “messianic” on the other hand, has to do with the absolute structure of the promise, of an absolutely indeterminate, let us say, a structural future, a future always to-come. The messianic future is not a future-present and is not sparked by a determinate Messiah; it is not futural simply in the sense that it has not as a matter of fact shown up yet, but futural in the sense of the very structure of the future. The messianic future is an absolute future, the very structure of the to-come that cannot in principle come about, the very openendedness of the present that makes it impossible for the present to draw itself into a circle, to close in and gather around itself. The messianic is the structure of the to come that exposes the contingency and deconstructibility of the present, exposing the alterability of what we like to call in English the “powers that be,” the powers that are present, the prestigious power of the present. The messianic future, the unformable figure of the Messiah in deconstruction, has to do with something absolutely unpresentable and unrepresentable that compromises the prestige of the present, the absolutely undeconstructible that breaks the spell of present constructions.

The messianic, Derrida says, is a “structure of experience,” the very structure of experience itself where experience means running up against the other, encountering something we could not anticipate, expect, fore-have, or fore-see, something that knocks our socks off, that bring us up short and takes our breath away.

*Vanitas vanitatum*, said Qoheleth in his best Latin, *et omnia vanitates*. The whole thing is a vanity, an idol. Everything is deconstructable, the French translation reads, but justice in itself, if there is such a thing, is not deconstructable. The essential indeterminacy of the messianic future, of the figure of the Messiah, is of the essence of its non-essence. The non-presence of the Messiah is the very stuff of his promise. For it is in virtue of the messianic that we can always, must always, have no alternative but to say, “come.” We can and we must pray, plead, desire the coming of the Messiah. Always.

That is part of the force of the story of the coming of the Messiah that Derrida repeats in the “Roundtable”, which is to be found at the end of Blachot’s *Writing the Disaster*. In this story, the Messiah, having appeared outside the city of Rome dressed in rags, is recognized by someone who penetrates this disguise—which is meant to shelter his presence—and who, “obsessed with questioning,” says to the Messiah, “when will you come?” The story, Blanchot says, has to do with the relation between the messianic “event,” Let us say with an event in messianic time, and its “nonoccurrence,” its noncoming about in ordinary historical time. For the coming of the Messiah, the messianic coming, is not to be confounded with his actual presence in recorded history, with occurring in ordinary time, with actually showing up in space and time, which would ruin everything. The coming of the Messiah has to do with the very structure of the messianic time, as the time of promise and expectation and opening to the future, for the “Come, Come” must resound always, according to Blanchot. The lightness of a messianic expectation, its buoyancy and agility, are not to be weighed down by the lead-footed of the present. The Messiah is the one whom we are *always* saying “Come, “ which is what keeps things on the move, The messianic has the structure of what Blanchot punningly calls *le pas au dela*: the step/not beyond, the beyond that is never reached but always pursued.

Were the Messiah ever to show up in the flesh, were *per impossibile*, his coming ever taken to be an occurrence in historical time, something that could be picked up on a video camera, that would be a disaster. The effect would be to shut down the very structure of time and history, to close off the structure of hope, desire, expectation, promise, in short, of the future. Even if, as some Jewish sages hold, the Messiah has actually come and gone in ordinary time, that would not be the “coming,” and it would still be necessary to say “Come.” That is why, in Christian messianism, where it is held that the Anointed One has already come, all eyes and all hope are turned, not only to his earthly sojourn, but to the day when he will come *again*, for the Messiah must always be *to come*. The Messiah is a very special promise. Namely a promise that would be broken were it kept, whose possibility is sustained by its impossibility.

Now, the remarkable thing is that all this is not just a bit of esoteric Jewish theology but the very stuff of this postmodern bugbear called deconstruction. Deconstruction turns on the unprecentable and unrepresentable, unforeseeable and unnamable, impossible and undeconstructible promise of something to come, something, I know not what, *je ne sais quoi*, let us say a justice to come, or a democracy to come, or a gift or a hospitality to come, a stranger to come. Deconstruction is messianic all the way down but its Messiah is *tout autre*, just one who shatters the stable horizons of exception, transgressing the possible and conceivable, beyond the seeable and foreseeable, and who is therefore not the private property of some chosen people.

### Crusader Turn

#### ---Turn Crusader --- The mission to create a universal community of believers rests on a foundation of endless crusade to eradicating non-believers. The alternative CANNOT resolve the society of enemies by uniting all into one community without reverting to genocide, because that very project cannot exist without the drive to eradicate the barbarians who refuse to enter the City of God.

Rasch 2003

William, Henry H.H. Remak Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University, Spring, Cultural Critique, Vol. 54, 135-137

Yes, this passage attests to the antiliberal prejudices of an unregenerate Eurocentric conservative with a pronounced affect for the counterrevolutionary and Catholic South of Europe. It seems to resonate with the apologetic mid-twentieth-century Spanish reception of Vitoria that wishes to justify the Spanish civilizing mission in the Americas. [8](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/cultural_critique/v054/54.1rasch.html#FOOT8) But the contrast between Christianity and humanism is not just prejudice; it is also instructive, because with it, Schmitt tries to grasp something both disturbing and elusive about the modern world—namely, the apparent fact that the liberal and humanitarian attempt to construct a world of universal friendship produces, as if by internal necessity, ever new enemies. For Schmitt, the Christianity of Vitoria, of Salamanca, Spain, 1539, represents a concrete, spatially imaginable order, centered (still) in Rome and, ultimately, Jerusalem. This, with its divine revelations, its Greek philosophy, and its Roman language and institutions, is the polis. This is civilization, and outside its walls lie the barbarians. The humanism that Schmitt opposes is, in his words, a philosophy of absolute humanity. By virtue of its universality and abstract normativity, it has no localizable polis, no clear distinction between what is inside and what is outside. Does humanity embrace all humans? Are there no gates to the city and thus no barbarians outside? If not, against whom or what does it wage its wars? We can understand Schmitt's concerns in the following way: Christianity distinguishes between believers and nonbelievers. Since nonbelievers can become believers, they must be of the same category of being. To be human, then, is the horizon within which the distinction between believers and nonbelievers is made. That is, humanity per se is not part of the distinction, but is that which makes the distinction possible. However, once the term used to describe the horizon of a distinction also becomes that distinction's positive pole, it needs its negative opposite. If humanity is both the horizon and the positive pole of the distinction that that horizon enables, then the negative pole can only be something that lies beyond that horizon, can only be something completely antithetical to horizon and positive pole alike—can only, in other words, be inhuman. As Schmitt says: Only with the concept of the human in the sense of absolute humanity does there appear as the other side of this concept a speciWcally new enemy, the inhuman. In the history of the nineteenth century, setting off the inhuman from the human is followed by an even deeper split, the one between the superhuman and the subhuman. In the same way that the human creates the inhuman, so in the history of humanity the superhuman brings about with a dialectical necessity the subhuman as its enemy twin.[9](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/cultural_critique/v054/54.1rasch.html#FOOT9) This "two-sided aspect of the ideal of humanity" (Schmitt 1988, Der Nomos der Erde, 72) is a theme Schmitt had already developed in his The Concept of the Political (1976) and his critiques of liberal pluralism (e.g., 1988, Positionen und Begriffe, 151-65). His complaint there is that liberal pluralism is in fact not in the least pluralist but reveals itself to be an overriding monism, the monism of humanity. Thus, despite the claims that pluralism allows for the individual's freedom from illegitimate constraint, Schmitt presses the point home that political opposition to liberalism is itself deemed illegitimate. Indeed, liberal pluralism, in Schmitt's eyes, reduces the political to the social and economic and thereby nullifies all truly political opposition by simply excommunicating its opponents from the High Church of Humanity. After all, only an unregenerate barbarian could fail to recognize the irrefutable benefits of the liberal order. Though he favorably opposes sixteenth-century Christianity to the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, Schmitt has no interest in reestablishing the hegemony of the Roman Church. Rather, he is in search of conceptual weapons with which to fight the contemporary enemy. But it is a failed search just as it is a failed contrast; for in Christianity, Schmitt finds not the other of humanism, but humanism's roots. In truth, what Schmitt calls humanism is but an intensification of the aspirations of the Roman Church. Unlike the Judaism from which it sprang, Christianity is not a tribal or national religion, but a religion of universal pretensions. [10](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/cultural_critique/v054/54.1rasch.html#FOOT10) The distinction between believer and nonbeliever is not a distinction between tribe and tribe or nation and nation; it is not a distinction between neighbor and foreigner or even one between finite and localizable friends and enemies. Rather, ideally, in the Christian world, the negative pole of the distinction is to be fully and finally consumed without remainder. The differences between families, tribes, nations, friends, and enemies are meant to disappear. In the final analysis there is no room for opposition, neither within the City of God nor against it, and the polis—call it Rome, call it Jerusalem—will encompass the entire world. That is precisely the purpose of its civilizing power. What Schmitt calls humanism is but a more complete universalization of the same dynamic. [11](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/cultural_critique/v054/54.1rasch.html#FOOT11) Christianity and humanism are both civilizing missions. In neither case can there be barbarians left outside the gates because eventually there will be no outside of the gates and, thus, no more gates. To live in the city, the barbarians must thoroughly give up their barbarian ways—their customs, their religion, their language. In the discourse that equates the polis with humanity, to remain a barbarian is not to remain outside the city, but to be included in the city as a moral and legal outlaw and thus to come under the city's moral and legal jurisdiction.

#### ---Christianity creates an all encompassing form of fluidity that the permutations openness resolves – The creation of an inhuman, non-Christian barbarian turns 100% of their argument --- The choice between belief and non-belief is a false one when imposed as the willful non-believer comes to symbolize all that must be eradicated.

Rasch 2003

William, Henry H.H. Remak Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University, Spring, Cultural Critique, Vol. 54, 135-137

The Spanish conquest of the New World gave rise to two pressing and interconnected questions: what type of humans (if humans they were) occupied this strange world, and what legal or moral justification was there for Spanish dominion over them and their possessions? The answer to the first question, and thus implicitly to the second, was simple, but needed further specification: they were barbarians. [4](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/cultural_critique/v054/54.1rasch.html#FOOT4) When the Greeks coined the word, they used it to distinguish the foreign "other" from themselves. If at first it merely meant the foreigner as such, by the fourth century B.C. it marked the foreigner as inherently inferior. By virtue of such an asymmetrical distinction between self and other, the qualities of the self are simply assumed, unstated, and silently equated with the norm, while the substandard properties of the other can be endlessly enumerated. To be Greek was to be in an ethnically, politically, culturally, and linguistically defined closed community. All else was, and remained, outside, to be ignored or, if noticed, to be dominated and used. When the early Christian church took the term as their own to distinguish between believers and nonbelievers, they divested it of its ethnic, linguistic, and geographic substance, for all humans had souls and all humans had the potential of being included in the Kingdom of Christ. That is, the distinction between the self and the other was no longer fixed, but fluid; the other could give up its otherness and become part of the larger and ever-expanding self—could, in a word, assimilate itself to the dominant group. Universalization, however, has its price. All peoples, not just Greeks, could now belong to an all-encompassing group, and by virtue of that possibility all peoples could be part of something called "humanity," but because Christians are in possession of the one and only Truth and because inclusion is now based on the choice to accept that one and only Truth, to refuse to join was condemned as moral perversity. One was offered a choice, but rather than a neutral either/or, the alternatives were labeled "right" and "wrong." Those who lived in vincible ignorance of Christ—those, in other words, who had heard but rejected the good news of the Gospel—committed a mortal sin and would face eternal damnation. While still on earth, such infidels could also be the targets of a "just war," a "crusade." Thus, though all peoples are members of [End Page 131] "humanity," some—the nonbelievers—are lesser members than others, possessing fewer rights and deserving opprobrium.